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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Melvin McCabe appeals from the district court's summary dismissal of his
petition for post-conviction relief and from its denial of his motion for the
appointment of post-conviction counsel.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
In affirming McCabe's judgment of conviction entered upon his guilty plea
to possession of methamphetamine, the Idaho Court of Appeals described the
underlying facts and proceedings as follows:
While arresting McCabe for driving without privileges, an
officer found a cigarette pack containing methamphetamine on
McCabe's person and various drug paraphernalia in his vehicle.
McCabe was charged with possession of a controlled substance
with the intent to deliver, driving without privileges, possession of
drug paraphernalia, failure to provide proof of insurance, and being
a persistent violator. The State later filed an amended information,
charging an enhancement under Idaho Code § 37-2739 based on
McCabe's prior misdemeanor conviction for possession of drug
paraphernalia.
McCabe was appointed counsel, who, upon McCabe's
request, filed a motion to withdraw. The district court denied the
motion and McCabe pied not guilty. McCabe's counsel filed a
second motion to withdraw, and after conducting a Faretta inquiry,
the district court determined that McCabe made a "free and
voluntary decision to represent himself' and allowed counsel to
withdraw.
McCabe pied guilty to an amended charge of possession of
a controlled substance, I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1 ), and the section 372739 enhancement, in exchange for dismissal of the remaining
counts and an agreement to recommend a unified sentence of
fourteen years, with six years determinate. The district court
imposed the sentence recommended by the State. McCabe filed a
timely notice of appeal and then filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35
motion for reduction of sentence, which the district court denied
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without a hearing. McCabe filed a motion to withdraw his guilty
plea and a motion for a retroactive competency hearing, arguing, in
relevant part, that he was under the influence of methamphetamine
such that he was unable to knowingly and intelligently waive his
right to counsel and to enter a guilty plea. Following a hearing, the
district court denied both motions
State v. McCabe, Docket No. 41357, 2014 Unpublished Opinion No. 789, pp.1-2
(Idaho App., October 30, 2014) (footnote omitted). The Idaho Court of Appeals
affirmed McCabe's conviction and the district court's denial of McCabe's motion
to withdraw his guilty plea.

kt

McCabe then filed a prose petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp.3-26.)
McCabe alleged: (1) his guilty plea and his waiver of his right to counsel were
constitutionally invalid because he was not informed that the Jerome County
Public Defender, who had previously represented him, had a fixed-fee contract
with Jerome County, which, McCabe asserted, constituted a conflict of interest;
and (2) the state "maliciously and vindictively" pursued the persistent violator
sentencing enhancement without the appropriate predicate offenses.

(Id.)

McCabe also requested the appointment of counsel to represent him on the
petition. (R., pp.30-32.)
The district court denied McCabe's motion for appointment of counsel,
concluding that McCabe's post-conviction claims were frivolous. (R., pp.37-38.)
After providing notice (R., pp.33-47), the court then summarily dismissed
McCabe's petition (R., pp.64-70). McCabe timely appealed. (R., pp.71-75.)
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ISSUE
McCabe states the issue on appeal as:
Did the court err by denying Mr. McCabe's request for
appointment of counsel when he alleged that his appointed counsel
labored under a conflict of interest and that performance was
adversely affected by the conflict?
(Appellant's brief, p. 6.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has McCabe failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion
by denying his motion to appoint post-conviction counsel with respect to his
conflict claim?
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ARGUMENT
McCabe Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its
Discretion By Denying His Motion To Appoint Post-Conviction Counsel With
Respect To His Conflict Claim
A.

Introduction
McCabe contends that the district court erred by denying his motion for

appointment of counsel with respect to his conflict claim.

(See generally

Appellant's brief.) McCabe's claim fails because a review of the record reveals
that McCabe failed to allege facts demonstrating the possibility of a valid claim.

B.

Standard Of Review
The decision to grant or deny a request for court-appointed counsel to

represent a post-conviction petitioner pursuant to I.C. § 19-4904 is discretionary.
Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004); Plant v.
State, 143 Idaho 758, 761, 152 P.3d 629, 632 (Ct. App. 2007).

C.

The District Court Acted Well Within Its Discretion To Deny McCabe's
Motion For Appointment Of Counsel
Post-conviction counsel should be appointed if the petitioner qualifies

financially and "alleges facts showing the possibility of a valid claim such that a
reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to retain counsel to
conduct a further investigation into the claim." Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651,
655,152 P.3d 12, 16 (2007); see also Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793,102 P.3d at
1112. If the claims are so patently frivolous that there appears no possibility that
they could be developed into a viable claim even with the assistance of counsel,
however, the court may deny the motion for counsel and proceed with the usual
4

procedure for dismissing meritless post-conviction petitions. Workman v. State,
144 Idaho 518, 529, 164 P.3d 798, 809 (2007); Newman v. State, 140 Idaho 491,
493, 95 P.3d 642, 644 (Ct. App. 2004).
In his post-conviction petition, McCabe asserted that his guilty plea and
his waiver of his right to counsel were constitutionally invalid because he was not
informed that the Jerome County Public Defender, who had previously
represented him, had a fixed-fee contract with Jerome County. 1 (R., pp.7-10.)
McCabe asserted that had he been informed of the fixed-fee contract, he would
have "opted for conflict-free counsel outside the office of the Jerome County
Public Defender," and that his motion to suppress evidence pursuant to the
Fourth Amendment would have been successful. (R., p.7.)
The district court denied McCabe's motion for appointment of counsel and
summarily dismissed McCabe's post-conviction petition after concluding that
McCabe's conflict claim was frivolous.

(R., pp.37-38, 64-70.)

The court's

decision was based upon several grounds, including: (1) McCabe failed to allege
facts raising the possibility of a valid conflict of interest claim; and (2) McCabe
waived his conflict claim by failing to raise it on direct appeal. (R., pp.64-67.) A
review of the record supports the district court's determination.

McCabe also alleged that the persistent violator sentencing enhancement was
not supported by appropriate predicate offenses. (R., pp.25-26.) McCabe does
not challenge the district court's denial of his motion for appointment of counsel
and summary dismissal of his petition with respect to this claim. (See generally
Appellant's brief.)
1
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1.

McCabe Failed To Allege Facts Demonstrating The Possibility Of A
Valid Conflict Of Interest Claim

The right to conflict-free representation derives from the Sixth Amendment
as applied to the states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1931 ).

The right has been

accorded "not for its own sake, but because of the effect it has on the ability of
the accused to receive a fair trial." Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 166 (2002)
(quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984)).
Where a defendant raises a conflict of interest claim alleging that his
counsel's personal interests directly conflict with counsel's obligation to provide
effective representation, the defendant must demonstrate that a conflict of
interest actually affected the adequacy of his lawyer's performance.

State v.

Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 61-62, 90 P.3d 278, 286-287 (2003); see also Cuyler v.
Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980) (where defendant alleges a conflict based
upon

his

counsel's

simultaneous

representation

of defendant and

the

prosecutor's key witness, defendant must demonstrate that an actual conflict of
interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance). Absent such a showing, a
defendant is not entitled to reversal of his conviction. Mickens, 535 U.S. at 17374; Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 785 (1987).
An actual conflict is defined by its effect on counsel, not by whether there
is a "mere theoretical division of loyalties." Mickens, 535 U.S. at 171, 172 n.5.
"[TJhe possibility of conflict is insufficient to impugn a criminal conviction." Dunlap
v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 62, 106 P.3d 376, 388 (2004) (citations omitted).

An

actual conflict will be shown to adversely affect counsel's performance where a
6

link between counsel's deficient performance and the conflict of interest is
demonstrated. See Lewis v. Mayle, 391 F.3d 989, 995 (9 th Cir. 2004); see also
United States v. Burns, 526 F.3d 852, 857 (5th Cir. 2008) (actual conflict
adversely affects counsel's performance when "there was some plausible
alternative defense strategy that could have been pursued, but was not, because
of the actual conflict").
As with other types of conflict of interest allegations, a defendant asserting
that his counsel had a financial-based conflict must demonstrate a link between
the alleged conflict and some deficient counsel performance.

See Bonin v.

Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 825 (9 th Cir. 1995) ("The fact that an attorney undertakes
the representation of a client because of a desire to profit does not by itself
create the type of direct 'actual' conflict of interest required.").

Further, courts

generally presume counsel "will subordinate his or her pecuniary interests and
honor his or her professional responsibility to a client." Caderno v. United States,
256 F.3d 1213, 1219 (11 th Cir. 2011) (citing United States v. Taylor, 129 F.3d 924,
932 (D.C. Cir. 1998)); see also Roll v. Bowersox, 16 F. Supp.2d 1066, 1078 (W.D.
Mo. 1998) (noting that "counsel are often required to represent clients without
being paid in full," but rejecting conflict of interest claim where there was "no
indication that counsel minimized the time spent on this case because he knew
he would not get paid for numerous hours of preparation"). Therefore, no per se
conflict arose from the fixed-fee arrangement between Jerome County and the
Jerome County Public Defender.
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Further, as the district court correctly recognized (R., p.39 n.3), the fixedfee arrangement in Jerome County was valid under Idaho law.

While the Idaho

legislature recently amended I.C. § 19-859(4) to prohibit such fixed-fee contracts
between counties and public defenders, this amendment only applies to such
contracts "entered into or renewed on or after" the effective date of the
amendment, March 25, 2014. I.C. § 19-859(4). The public defender contract at
issue in the present case went into effect in October 2011 and expired in
September 2013.

(R., p.13.)

McCabe entered his guilty plea in May 2013.

(#41357, 2 5/13/13Tr., p.6, L.14-p.24, L.22.)
McCabe has also failed to allege facts demonstrating that any theoretical
attorney conflict caused by the fixed-fee arrangement resulted in deficient
counsel performance.

McCabe did not describe the nature of the Fourth

Amendment suppression issue, nor did he attempt to explain how such a motion
would have been successful had he been appointed substitute counsel. 3 Though
McCabe implied that his appointed counsel spent little time on his case because

2

The Idaho Supreme Court granted McCabe's motion to augment the record with
transcripts prepared for McCabe's underlying direct appeal, Docket No. 41357.
(8/18/15 Order.)
3

After the district court granted McCabe's appointed counsel's motion to
withdraw from the case, and permitted McCabe to represent himself, McCabe
filed a pro se suppression motion. See Idaho Data Repository, Jerome County
Case No. CR-2013-00317). The district court denied this motion after a hearing.
(See id.) It appears that no transcript of this hearing was prepared for McCabe's
direct appeal, and that no such transcript is part of the appellate record in this
case. Missing portions of the record are presumed to support the actions of the
court below. State v. Repici, 122 Idaho 538, 541, 835 P.2d 1349, 1352 (Ct. App.
1992). Further, McCabe did not challenge the district court's denial of his motion
to suppress on direct appeal.
See McCabe, Docket No. 41357, 2014
Unpublished Opinion No. 789.
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of the fixed-fee arrangement (See R., pp.8-9), he has not specifically asserted
that appointed counsel's apparent decision declining to pursue a suppression
motion constituted deficient performance,

nor has he alleged any facts

supporting such an assertion. McCabe's conclusory and vague assertions did
not entitle him to the appointment of counsel to represent him on his postconviction petition.
Finally, McCabe's statements made during the hearing on his appointed
counsel's second motion to withdraw are contrary to his implied assertion in his
post-conviction petition that counsel performed less work on his case than she
would have absent the fixed-free arrangement. At that hearing, McCabe stated
that appointed counsel did an "outstanding job" on his case, and that his decision
to represent himself was "no reflection on her." (#41357, 3/4/13 Tr., p.13, L.15 p.14, L.20.)

McCabe also specifically declined to request substitute counsel

upon the withdrawal of his appointed counsel. (#41357, 3/4/13 Tr., p.11, L.24 p.12, L.3.)

While McCabe had previously sought the appointment of substitute

counsel (see R., p.34), he informed the court that he changed his mind and
wished to represent himself. (#41357, 3/4/13 Tr., p.9, L.23- p.10, L.10.) This is
contrary to McCabe's assertion from his post-conviction petition that he would
have sought substitute counsel, rather than represent himself, if he had been
informed of the fixed-fee arrangement between Jerome County and the Jerome
County Public Defender's Office.
McCabe failed to allege facts demonstrating the possibility of a valid
conflict of interest claim. He has therefore failed to demonstrate that the district

9

court abused its discretion by denying his motion for appointment of counsel with
respect to this claim.
2.

McCabe Waived His Conflict Claim By Failing To Raise It On Direct
Appeal

Post-conviction petitions are not substitutes for appeals, and applicants for
post-conviction relief are not allowed to raise issues in post-conviction
proceedings that could have been raised on direct appeal unless the issues were
not known and could not reasonably have been known during the direct appeal.
I.C. § 19-4901 (b).

Raudebaugh v. State, 135 Idaho 602, 606, 21 P.3d 924, 928

(2001); Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573,581,976 P.2d 927,935 (1999); Rodgers v.
State, 129 Idaho 720, 932 P.2d 348 (1997).
In this case, as the district court correctly concluded, McCabe waived his
conflict claim by failing to raise it on direct appeal. McCabe alleged that he was
not personally aware of the factual basis for the alleged conflict - the fixed-fee
contract between Jerome County and the Jerome County Public Defender - at
the time he waived his right to counsel and entered a prose guilty plea. (R., p.7.)
However, it appears from the record that McCabe and/or his appointed appellate
attorney were aware, or reasonably could have been aware, of this factual basis
for the claim at the time he challenged his conviction on direct appeal.

In his

response to the district court's notice of intent to dismiss his post-conviction
petition, McCabe asserted that he "discussed with appellate counsel the
possibility of raising the constitutionality of the waiver of counsel." (R., p.55.) In
an attempt to raise an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel post-conviction
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claim, 4 McCabe further alleged that appellate counsel "refused" to raise this issue
on appeal. (Id.) McCabe was not entitled to a second opportunity to raise this
issue in a post-conviction petition.

The district court therefore correctly

determined that the claim was waived pursuant to I.C. § 19-4901 (b).
The district court correctly concluded that McCabe failed to allege facts
raising the possibility of a valid conflict claim.

McCabe has therefore failed to

show that the district court abused its discretion in denying McCabe's motion for
appointment of counsel, or by summarily dismissing his post-conviction petition.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
order denying McCabe's motion for appointment of counsel and order summarily
dismissing McCabe's post-conviction petition.
DATED this 2 nd day of November, 2015.

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General

4

The district court acknowledged McCabe's assertion that his appellate counsel
was ineffective, but declined to consider the claim because it was raised for the
first time in McCabe's response to the district court's notice of intent to dismiss
the petition. (R., p.67 (citing Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 978 P.2d 241 (Ct.
App. 1999).) McCabe has not challenged this determination on appeal.
11
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